We present a theory that examines the optimal match between …rm R&D units and external partners for projects that involve problem solving. We have a …rm selecting an external partner conditional on the learning costs of its internal R&D unit. We show that there exists a matching equilibrium with property that external partners with low learning costs for a project work with R&D units that also have low learning costs for the same project. Empirically, we use a dataset of Spanish R&D …rms and relate their share of R&D outsourcing to universities to the composition of their R&D units, described by the presence of sta¤ with a PhD. Our main …nding is that, controlling for endogeneity, …rms that employ R&D sta¤ with a PhD outsource relatively more to universities than to …rms. We interpret this result as evidence that R&D units with relatively low learning costs for basic projects tend to match with external partners, universities, with relatively low learning costs for the same projects.
Introduction
The importance of external sources of knowledge for …rm innovation has been extensively examined (Hagedoorn, 2001 ; Thursby and Thursby, 2006; Branstetter, 2005 ; Alcacér and Chung, 2007). Hagedoorn (2001) documents a steady increase in inter-…rm R&D partnerships during the 1980s and the 1990s. Branstetter (2005) , Thursby and Thursby (2006) , and Alcacér and Chung (2007) provide evidence that …rms increasingly rely on input provided by universities and that the quality of this input determines the countries in which …rms choose to locate their R&D activities.
The existing literature has focused on the role that the absorptive capacity of …rms plays in their choice between conducting their R&D activities internally or in collaboration with external partners (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 ; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002) . Other studies have focused on the importance of incoming, source-speci…c, spillovers for …rms' decisions regarding the partners they collaborate with in their R&D projects (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005) . Another important aspect of …rm R&D collaboration that has received little attention is the optimal match between a …rm's internal R&D unit and a potential partner on an R&D project, conditional on some characteristics of both partners.
Our analysis intends to …ll this gap by extending the theory of hierarchical sorting, developed by Garicano (2000) , Garicano and Hubbard (2005) , and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) , to the optimal match between a …rm's internal R&D unit and an external partner for projects that involve problem solving and that require the active participation of the internal R&D unit. We test the prediction of our theory using a rich database on R&D in Spanish manufacturing …rms.
In the theory, a …rm has to choose a project from a menu of projects that di¤er in the level of some characteristic. We examine projects that are complex enough to require the …rm's internal R&D unit to work in collaboration with an external partner. The advantage is that the external partner has a lower cost of learning to solve problems that are relevant to the project and thus can solve a larger proportion of problems than a …rm's R&D unit. As we consider a situation of sticky labor, and thus the composition of the internal R&D unit is …xed, the choice of the project depends on the learning cost of the internal R&D unit. We show that there exists a matching equilibrium with property that, for a given project, external partners with low learning costs for that project work with R&D units that also have low learning costs for the same project. This allows the external partner to relatively specialize in the solutions to less common problems, while the internal R&D unit relatively specializes in solutions to the most common ones. This result is interesting in that it suggests that, for joint R&D projects that involve problem solving, it is not pro…table for a …rm to entirely outsource the solution of problems to an external partner, and have the internal unit specialize on the application of these solutions. On the contrary, …rm pro…ts are maximized when also the internal unit actively participates in the solution of problems and when it does so at the lowest possible learning costs. In this way, the external partner avoids spending time assisting the internal R&D unit and dedicates its limited time to solving the least common problems. While our model is an extension of the theory of hierarchical sorting within an organization developed by Garicano (2000) , Garicano and Hubbard (2005) , and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), it di¤ers in two important aspects. First, our model deals with the optimal match between an internal …rm's unit and a partner, outside of the …rm's organization. Yet, even in this case we show that an optimal matching occurs, along the lines of the learning costs of the …rm's unit and the partner. Second, we examine a situation with sticky labor and, thus, in our case, the choice of the external partner is conditional on the project a …rm has selected, which has to re ‡ect the (invariant) learning cost structure of the internal R&D unit. Finally, relative to the theory of absorptive capacity, our model proposes a complementary explanation of the mechanisms that allow a …rm to extract a value from its collaborations. In their seminal paper, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest that the value to a …rm from a collaboration increases in a …rm's level of investment in those assets that are speci…c to that collaboration. In our model, such type of investment decreases the learning costs for the problems the partners have to solve, and with that it increases the value of the collaboration to the …rm, relative to other types of collaborations the …rm can engage in.
We test the theoretical model using information from a sample of Spanish manufacturing …rms that conducted innovation activities during [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . We estimate a model in which we relate the share of …rms' R&D outsourcing to universities with the compositions of their R&D units, described by the presence of sta¤ with a PhD degree. The logic here is that both universities and R&D units with PhD sta¤ face lower costs in conducting relatively more basic projects than either companies to which a …rm may want to outsource or sta¤ who lack PhD degrees (see for example Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Aghion et al., 2008; Lacetera, 2009; Gruber et al., 2012) . We …nd evidence that R&D units with PhD sta¤ tend to collaborate relatively more with universities than with other partners, even after controlling for endogeneity in the composition of the internal unit. We interpret this result as evidence that R&D units with relatively lower learning costs for basic projects tend to match with external partners, universities, with relatively lower learning costs for the same projects. In contrast to previous empirical studies on incoming spillovers (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004 ) and on …rms' internal R&D intensity (Leiponen, 2005; Lopez, 2008) , our results are novel in that they focus on the composition of …rms'R&D units rather than on the information they can access externally or internally. Moreover, while previous studies have examined the role of incoming spillovers on the likelihood of collaboration with di¤erent categories of external partners, we focus on the relative importance of external partners to a …rm R&D unit. We argue that the pattern of external collaborations re ‡ects an optimal match of internal R&D units and external partners along the lines of their learning costs for the projects they work on. Finally, in contrast to the work by Cockburn and Henderson (1998) , which examines the correlation between a …rm's degree of connection with universities and the …rm's patent productivity, we look at a …rm's decision regarding the partners it collaborate with in its R&D projects, conditional on the composition of its R&D unit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the model. Section three presents an empirical estimation of the theory. Section four concludes.
A matching model of outsourcing
In this section, we present a model in which the manager of an R&D …rm needs to select a project from a menu of projects that di¤er in some characteristic. Our focus is on projects that involve problem solving. In this model, labor is sticky and the …rm's project choice depends on the knowledge of its internal R&D unit, the composition of which does not change. This analysis is appropriate to analyze the short-run decisions of …rms, especially in contexts, in which the labor market is characterized by important rigidities, such as that in Spain.
Once the …rm's manager has made her choice, she needs choose an external partner to collaborate with the internal R&D unit on the project. We examine …rms'R&D projects that are complex enough to require the support of an external partner. The fundamental problem facing the …rm consists of …nding the optimal match between an internal R&D unit and an external partner, according to some characteristics of both. This study is based on models developed by Garicano (2000) , Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) , and Garicano and Hubbard (2005) and extends them to the optimal match between …rm R&D units and external partners to which the …rm outsources a component of its R&D projects.
Intuitively, the advantage of hiring an external partner is that the partner faces lower costs to solve the problems that are generated from a project and, therefore, can solve a larger range of problems than a …rm's R&D unit. The comparative advantage at solving problems of the external partner derives either from the experience it has accumulated from working on similar types of projects in the past or because it has either the necessary instrumentation or the appropriate incentives to solve problems at relatively low costs.
Model setup
A …rm needs to choose a project, p, from a continuum of projects, [p; p]. Projects di¤er in a characteristic, and they are ordered according to increasing levels of this characteristic. Hence, p is endowed with the lowest level of the characteristic, and p with the highest. The …rm can only choose one project. This project involves problem solving. As in Garicano (2000) , Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) , and Garicano and Hubbard (2005) , problems di¤er in that some of them occur more frequently than others. The cumulative density function of problems is F (z), with higher values of z being associated with rarer problems. Thus, f 0(z) < 0.
A …rm's R&D unit divides its time between learning how to solve problems and producing. We assume that the unit spends an amount of time t on production and the remaining time learning how to solve problems. Moreover, for every unit of time the R&D unit spends on production it encounters a problem. We assume that the cost of learning to solve problems on the interval [0; z i ], expressed in units of time, is proportional to the length of the interval and equal to c i z i . Thus, if an internal R&D unit spends c i z i units of time learning how to solve problems, up to z i , it will dedicate the remaining time (1 c i z i ) to producing. The R&D unit can solve a proportion of problems equal to F (z i ) and requires external assistance for the remaining (1 F (z i )). Essentially, the unit can solve the most common problems and seeks assistance for the less common ones.
The …rm needs to pay the external partner a payment, K. The market of external partners is competitive, and, thus, each partner is paid an amount, K, which is equal to the opportunity cost of participating in the …rm's project. We assume that the opportunity cost is the same for all external partners. The logic here is that the external partner specializes in solving certain types of problems, and it can either use its knowledge for the project that the …rm is interested in working on or for other projects with other partners. During the time that the partner works with the …rm's R&D unit, which we normalize to 1, the partner learns how to solve problems on the interval [0; z e ], at a cost c e z e and provides assistance to the …rm's unit for the problems that the latter cannot solve. The learning costs of the external partner have to be lower than those of the internal R&D unit, (c e < c i ), otherwise the …rm would not …nd it pro…table to hire an external partner to work on a given project. We rule out the possibility that the external partner might spend time producing problems relevant for a …rm by assuming that the time cost of producing one problem faced by the external partner is greater than one. The logic here is that the comparative advantage of the external partner lies in problem solving and not in production. This assumption rules out the possibility that a project might be entirely outsourced to an external partner. Similar to Garicano (2000) , Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) , and Garicano and Hubbard (2005) , assisting the R&D unit involves a time cost, h, with h < 1 1 , that is incurred by the external partner whenever it assists the …rm's R&D unit. Thus, even if the external partner does not know the solution to a problem, as this lies within the interval (z e ; 1], it still incurs the cost h, which we can view in this case as the partner's cost of determining whether it knows the solution to the problem. This cost is the same for all external partners.
The time constraint of the external partner is:
Given the time constraint of the external partner, the lower the proportion of problems that the …rm's R&D unit can solve, the greater the time the external partner has to spend assisting the unit, and the less time it has left to learn the solutions to problems that are relevant for a project. In this model knowledge is cumulative (Griliches, 1979) , and thus, even if the external partner assists the …rm's unit to solve problems in the interval (z i ; z e ], it still has to learn how to solve problems in the interval [0; z i ]. This setting corresponds to a situation in which the external partner needs to spend some time to acquire the knowledge the …rm's R&D unit has accumulated on a project before it is able to assist the unit in expanding its knowledge frontier.
From the external partner's time constraint (1), we derive an expression for z e , which is equal to:
The external partner's fraction of problems it can solve, which corresponds to its knowledge level, is an increasing function of the knowledge level of the …rm's R&D unit, z i . The greater z i is, the lower the range of problems for which the R&D unit requires external assistance, and the greater the time the external partner can dedicate to learning how to solve rarer problems. Moreover, z e is decreasing in c e . This is because the larger c e is, the greater the cost of learning how to solve problems in a given range, and the smaller the range of problems solved is.
The manager' s choice of an internal R&D unit and the external partner
The relevant decisions for a …rm can be described as follows. The …rm selects a project, p, from the interval [p; p]. It then selects an external partner that will collaborate with the internal R&D unit on the project, such that their match maximizes the …rm's pro…ts. The match between the …rm's R&D unit and the external partner occurs with respect to their learning costs, c i and c e , for the project the …rm has selected. Conditional on the learning costs of the internal R&D unit and the resulting match with the external partner, the …rm chooses the knowledge levels of the R&D unit and the external partner, z i and z e , that maximize the …rm's pro…ts. The choice of the internal unit's knowledge level, z i , has to be such that, for given values of c i , c e and h, z e > z i . If this were not the case, the …rm would not …nd it pro…table to hire an external partner.
The …rm's revenue, R, derives from commercializing the output that is generated from a project. Production occurs any time that either the internal R&D unit or the external partner knows the solution to a problem. Thus, the …rm's revenue is equal to F (z e )(1 c i z i ), given that z i is a subset of z e . The inputs z i and z e are substitutes in the …rm's production function because @R @zi@ze < 0. This is because R depends on the proportion of problems that are solved and the resulting production. However, because the internal unit has to divide its (limited) time between solving problems and producing, the …rm faces the following trade-o¤. The more time the internal unit spends solving problems, which allows the external partner to concentrate on the least common ones and increases the total fraction of problem solved, the fewer problems end up being produced. We shall restrict our attention to the case in which the magnitude of substitution is su¢ ciently small and, speci…cally, smaller than
. For the region of the parameters such that this condition holds, the fraction of problems solved by the external and the internal unit is decreasing in c e . The alternative would be that increasing values of c e lead the internal unit to make up for the high learning costs of the external partner by solving an higher fraction of problems, and hence reducing the time the external partner has to spend assisting the internal unit. We rule out this alternative as we (reasonably) assume that the primary goal of hiring an external partner is to ease the task of the internal unit, without the latter having to make up for the de…ciencies of the …rst.
The costs the …rm has to incur are represented by i) the payment owed to the R&D unit w = w(c), and ii) the payment owed to the external partner that takes the form of a lump-sum payment equal to K. The payment, w(c), the …rm o¤ers to the internal R&D unit is a function of the R&D unit's average learning costs for the projects it is required to work on during its life-cycle. Because we are interested in a …rm's projects that require some level of outsourcing, we posit that K is su¢ ciently small to ensure that the …rm always …nds it pro…table to outsource part of the project. Relaxing this assumption would imply that the …rm's project choice takes into account the cost of hiring an external partner. Moreover, we assume that K is at least equal to the compensation that the internal R&D unit with the lowest learning cost for p would receive. This assumption rules out the possibility that the external partner might …nd it optimal to be hired by the …rm.
We de…ne the …rm's maximization problem as:
Substituting for z e , we rewrite:
The …rst order condition is:
The pair (z i ; z e ), derived from the …rm's maximization problem, is a local maximum given that
Characterization of a matching equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the properties of a matching equilibrium. To this end, we allow for a continuum of …rms distributed across projects [p; p]. Moreover, for a given project, p, the density function for the R&D unit's cost of learning problems relevant for project p is
Similarly, the density function for the external partners' cost of learning the problems relevant to p is '(c e (p)) and its support is [c e (p),c e (p)].
The …rst equilibrium condition that needs to be met is that, for every project, p 2 [p; p], the number of external partners that …rms …nd it optimal to hire, n D (p), be equal to the number of external partners that …nd it optimal to work for on p, n O (p):
With n O (p) 2 to ensure that the external partner's market is competitive. The second condition is that the …rm should not …nd it pro…table to deviate from the choice of the external partner it has been tentatively assigned. Computing the partial derivative of the optimized pro…ts , generated from project p, with respect to c e (p), we obtain:
Because the sign of the derivative is negative, the optimal choice of the manager consists of hiring an external partner that can provide z e (p) at the lowest learning costs for that project. That is: c e (p) = c e (p). Thus, for c e (p) = c e (p), the …rm does not …nd it pro…table to deviate from its choice of external partner.
The third condition is that the project the …rm chooses, p, is such that the learning costs of its internal R&D unit for that project maximize the …rm's pro…t. Computing the partial derivative of the optimized pro…ts, , with respect to c i (p), we obtain:
Where, dw dci(p) < 0. The choice of the project has to be such that expression (5) is equal to zero and
At the optimum, the …rm's optimal project choice, p, has to satisfy the following condition:
If we take the full derivative of this condition, we obtain:
This implies that:
The sign of
dci(p) depends on the sign of the cross-partial
given that by the second order condition
is:
This results in the following proposition regarding the matching between internal R&D units and external partners.
Proposition 1 There exists an optimal matching equilibrium such that for a given project, p, both the internal R&D unit and the external partner have the lowest learning costs for that project. Proof. See Appendix.
The result in Proposition 1 shows that it is optimal for a …rm that the internal R&D unit and the external partner have a similar comparative advantage in problem solving. This is because it allows the external partner to spend relatively more time solving rarer problems than assisting the internal R&D unit. Hence, the external partner relatively specializes in solving rarer problems, while the internal R&D unit relatively specializes in solving the most common ones.
We have considered a model with sticky labor. This model is a good …t for our Spanish panel dataset, which is characterized by low levels of intra-…rm variation in the composition of R&D units. It also …ts well with any short-run analysis of a …rm's project decision. However, one might wonder whether the results in Proposition 1 also apply to a case in which …rms' R&D employees are allowed to move across …rms or from a …rm's R&D unit to what we have de…ned as an "external partner". In such a scenario, it is plausible that the …rm would select a project that guarantees the highest expected return and choose the composition of the internal R&D unit accordingly. Given expression (4), the …rm would still …nd it pro…table to hire an external partner with the lowest learning costs for a project. However, it would now hire an internal R&D unit such that, given the project chosen, its learning costs would ensure that expression (5) equals zero. The R&D employees would either decide to work for …rm or be an "external partner", based on the expected compensation they are o¤ered. Finally, the …rm would still opt for an internal R&D unit and an external partner that have the lowest learning costs for the project the …rm has chosen, provided that the substitution between their knowledge levels is small.
Empirical estimation
In the theory section we have shown that the learning costs of an internal R&D unit determine a …rms'choice of the project the R&D unit will be working on and, consequently, the type of external partner the unit will work with. Our main result is that for each …rm's project, the optimal match between an internal R&D unit and an external partner is such that both the internal unit and the external partner have the lowest learning costs for that project.
In this section we analyze the optimal choice of the …rm regarding the type of external partner it works with, conditional on the characteristics of the internal R&D unit to which an R&D project has been assigned. To this end, we employ a rich dataset on Spanish R&D manufacturing …rms that conducted some amount of R&D outsourcing. We relate these …rms' shares of R&D outsourcing to universities to the composition of their internal R&D units, which we de…ne by the presence of sta¤ with a PhD degree. The logic here is that i) universities should face lower costs in conducting relatively more basic projects than private companies to which a …rm might want to outsource; and ii) R&D units with PhD sta¤ should face lower costs in conducting relatively more basic projects than R&D units with sta¤ that lack PhD degrees (see for example Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Aghion et al., 2008; Lacetera, 2009; Gruber et al., 2012). Hence, for joint R&D projects, if the internal R&D units and their external partners indeed face the trade-o¤s we have described in the theory, then ceteris paribus we should observe that R&D units with PhD sta¤ outsource relatively more to universities than to other companies.
Description of the dataset
The empirical analysis employs information from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC), which is a statistical instrument designed to study the evolution of the innovation activities of Spanish …rms over time. PITEC is a panel survey conducted by the Spanish National Statistics Institute. It is part of a European-wide project known as the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) that consists of a series of surveys that are administered in every European Union country, including Norway and Iceland, with the goal of collecting information on the innovation activities of …rms located in these countries. The information provided by these surveys has been extensively used in the economic literature to address innovation-related research questions ( , we restrict our analysis to innovating …rms that operated in the manufacturing sector. Our de…nition of innovating …rms encompasses …rms that continuously employed R&D personnel during 2006-2009. Because the focus of our analysis is on …rms that have conducted at least some R&D outsourcing on a given year, we further restrict the sample to these …rms and denote the corresponding sample sample A. This sample comprises 4,191 …rm-year observations and 1,457 …rms. As shown in Table 1 , sample A decreases from 1,109 …rms in 2006 to 984 …rms in 2009, due to a reduction in R&D outsourcing by …rms. As a check for robustness, we also conduct the analysis at the level of innovating …rms, without restricting the analysis to those that on a given year had engaged in outsourcing. We denote the corresponding sample sample B. Sample B is a balanced panel of 2,352 …rms and 9,408 …rm-year observations. The di¤erence in the number of …rms between sample A and sample B is because 895 …rms did not engage in outsourcing during our period of interest.
The average annual amount spent on outsourcing by …rms in sample A is 641,132 (2006) Euros. The average share of outsourcing to universities is 17.5%; the remaining share of …rm outsourcing is mainly directed to other …rms. The percentage of …rms that employ R&D personnel with PhD degrees is 26.5%; and among these …rms, the average percentage of employees with PhD degrees is 21. In sample B, 20% of the …rms employ R&D personnel with PhD degrees; and among these …rms, the average percentage of employees with PhD degrees is 25. Not surprisingly, the variability in the PhD composition of …rm R&D units is higher across …rms than within …rms. In sample A, the across-…rm standard deviation is 0.39, while the within-…rm standard deviation is 0.18. In sample B, the corresponding …gures are 0.35 and 0.17, respectively. Moreover, in samples A and B, the within-…rm variation is generated by only 5% of the sample observations. As expected, the highest concentration of sta¤ with PhD degrees is in the pharmaceutical sector: 73% of pharmaceutical …rms in sample A and 80% of pharmaceutical …rms in sample B employ R&D personnel with PhD degrees. The chemistry sector is next with 36% of the …rms in sample A and 43% of …rms in sample B employing R&D personnel with PhD degrees. 
Econometric methodology
To test whether the composition of a …rm's R&D unit a¤ects the share of …rm R&D outsourcing to universities, we estimate a model that relates the share of …rm R&D outsourcing to universities to the composition of their internal R&D units and a number of controls. The equation we estimate is:
where Out_U N I it is the share of a …rm's i R&D outsourcing to universities (in logs) in year t. The variable P hD it is a dummy that takes the value of one if the R&D unit employs at least one employee with a PhD degree. We also estimate an alternative speci…cation of equation 1 that considers the share of R&D sta¤ that holds a PhD degree (P hD it _Share) in logs. Finally, X it is a matrix of controls that we believe may impact the direction of a …rm's outsourcing.
Speci…cally, X it includes …rm size (Size), which we measure by the log of a …rm's number of employees, and …rm R&D intensity (R&D Intensity), which we de…ne as the log of a …rm's total R&D expenditures per employee 3 . These controls have been extensively used in the economic literature (see for instance Levinthal, 1989 and Veugelers, 2002) as proxies for the absorptive capacity of …rms, and they have been shown to a¤ect R&D outsourcing by …rms. Additionally, we control for the size of the R&D unit, Size R&D unit, with a count of the full time equivalents working in an R&D unit. We also include a dummy that takes a value of one if a …rm sells its products overseas (Export); a dummy that takes a value of one if a …rm is foreign-owned (Foreign); a dummy that takes a value of one if a …rm is a parent company (Parent); and a dummy that takes a value of one if a …rm is the product of a joint venture (Joint_venture). These dummies are meant to capture factors that might a¤ect the outsourcing decisions of a …rm.
Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), we control for a …rm's obstacles to innovation. We distinguish between four types of obstacles. The …rst is a lack of funds available for innovation. In the Spanish survey, …rms rated the following options on a scale from one (very important) to four (unimportant): i) lack of funds within the …rm or group and ii) a lack of funds from sources outside the …rm. To measure the …rst type of obstacle, we use a dummy that takes a value of one if a …rm attached moderate or high importance to either i) or ii). We denote the corresponding variable Obstacle_funds. The second obstacle to innovation we control for refers to a lack of quali…ed personnel assigned to innovation activities. As a measure, we include a dummy that takes a value of one if a …rm responded that a lack of quali…ed personnel was of moderate or high importance. We denote the corresponding variable Obstacle_quali…ed. The third obstacle to innovation is a lack of information. In the survey, using the same scale as above, …rms rated the importance they attached to the i) lack of information about technology; ii) lack of information about markets. We include a dummy that the takes a value of one if a …rm responded that either i) or ii) was of moderate or high importance. We denote the corresponding variable Obstacle_information. Finally, the fourth obstacle we consider is the di¢ culty of …nding partners for innovation projects. We include a dummy that the takes a value of one if a …rm responded that this obstacle was of moderate or high importance. We denote the corresponding variable Obstacle_partner. The rationale for controlling for obstacles to innovation is that these may a¤ect the type and the organization of projects that are assigned to a …rm's R&D unit and, thus, the R&D outsourcing decisions of a …rm.
We also control for the degree to which …rms can appropriate the results from their innovation projects. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2005) have found that the appropriability of results is likely to be an issue when a …rm considers outsourcing to other …rms rather than to universities. Because our dependent variable is de…ned as the share of R&D outsourcing to universities, where the remaining share is represented by outsourcing to …rms, we expect appropriability to have an impact on our outcome measure. We follow Czarnitzki et al. (2007) and construct a measure of industry e¤ectiveness at appropriating results from innovation. Hence, we average the scores (from one to four) at the 2-digit NACE industry level that …rms reported when answering the following question: "how important are your competitors as a source of information for the innovation process?" 4 We then rescale the total score to a measure that varies between zero and one, and we denote this measure Appropriability.
We also include a measure for the local availability of university knowledge, which is likely to a¤ect the decision of …rms to outsource to universities (Ja¤e, 1989; Mans…eld and Lee, 1996; Audretsch, 2005) . This is de…ned as the total number of scienti…c articles (expressed in logs) that were published in 2005-2009 by universities located in the same region as the …rm and that are relevant to a …rm's industry. We denote this variable Publications. Finally, we control for industry, region 5 , and year …xed e¤ects.
Obtaining evidence on the causal relationship between the composition of a …rm's R&D unit and the share of R&D outsourcing to universities is complicated by a number of factors. The decision of a …rm to hire a certain R&D unit may be a¤ected by its expectations regarding the availability of external partners with which the corresponding R&D unit could collaborate. Moreover, it may also be a¤ected by the local availability of R&D employees, which are partly supplied by universities. To the extent that we control for the local availability of university knowledge, then this should not be a serious concern. However, it may still be the case that our measure for the availability of university knowledge is subject to measurement error. Indeed, not all university knowledge is contained in scienti…c articles but it may still be relevant to …rms. Further biases could be caused by omitted variables that might be correlated with both the composition of a …rm's R&D unit and the …rm's decision to outsource to universities. To address these problems, we estimate an Instrumental Variables (IV), continuous, regression model that replaces the variables P hD it and P hD it _Share, in equations 1 and 2, respectively, with their predicted values. We follow Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2005) and derive the predicted values by regressing P hD it and P hD it _Share on the industry average of PhD sta¤ employed 6 and the other exogenous regressors.
We estimate our IV models using a two-stage least squares estimator, which delivers consistent estimates and requires few distributional assumptions (Wooldridge, 2002 ; Angrist and Pischke, 2008). We cluster standard errors at the …rm level. 5 We include industry dummies for the NACE-2 industry sectors. We also include dummies for the following NUTS1 regions: Northwest, Northeast, Center, East, and South. 6 In the count we exclude …rm i. Table 3 reports the regression results for the impact of the composition of a …rm's R&D unit on the share of outsourcing to universities. The …rst and the second columns display the OLS estimation results, while the third and the fourth columns display the IV estimation results 7 . Columns one and three examine the impact of having at least one R&D employee with a PhD degree (P hD it ). Conversely, columns two and four examine the impact of the share of R&D sta¤ that holds a PhD degree (P hD it _Share).
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Results
We …nd that having at least one R&D employee with a PhD degree has a positive impact on the share of outsourcing to universities, all else being equal. The coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. Having at least one R&D employee with a PhD increases the share of outsourcing to universities by 90%. We interpret this result as evidence that R&D units with relatively lower learning costs for basic projects tend to match with external partners, universities, with relatively lower learning costs for the same projects. While this result does not rule out the possibility that R&D units with PhD sta¤ collaborate with other …rms, it shows that for R&D projects, collaboration tends to be relatively more intense among partners with similar comparative advantages. Collaboration with private companies might still occur for a number of reasons. First, there are some projects, which do not necessarily involve learning new problems, and for these projects our matching story might not apply. Second, some …rms might have lower learning costs than universities, for basic projects. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish in our data the characteristics of …rms to whom outsourcing is done. Finally, it might be that the conditions o¤ered by universities, including the price of the collaboration, are more onerous than those o¤ered by private companies, thus inducing a …rm to opt for its second-best option.
When we consider the share of R&D sta¤ with a PhD degree, its impact on the share of …rm outsourcing to universities is still positive and highly signi…cant. The elasticity is 0.22. Having taken the endogeneity of P hD it and P hD it _Share into account, the results still hold. Their coe¢ cients are still positive and statistically signi…cant at the 1% signi…cance level. This suggests a causal relationship between employing internal R&D sta¤ with relatively lower costs for conducting basic projects and selecting external partners with a similar cost structure.
The results regarding the control variables reveal additional, interesting insights. The impact of …rm size on the share of outsourcing to universities is negative, although only statistically signi…cant at the 10% level, as presented in column two. Moreover, …rms that reported a lack of quali…ed personnel as an important obstacle to innovation tend to outsource relatively less to universities. Interestingly, …rms that indicated that a lack of information on either technology or external markets was an important obstacle to innovation tend to outsource relatively more to universities, suggesting that universities play an important role in …lling information gaps of …rms' R&D units. Finally, …rms that had indicated di¢ culty in …nding external partners tend to collaborate relatively more with universities. This last result might point to an additional role of universities, one of providing knowledge when it cannot be o¤ered by other partners. Finally, as expected, the local availability of university knowledge is an important driver of the …rms'decisions to outsource to universities.
h Insert Table 3 about here i
Robustness check analysis
We conduct a series of robustness checks to ensure that our results of interest hold using di¤erent model speci…cations. First, we estimate a Heckman selection model where we model the likelihood that a …rm has outsourcing expenditures as a function of the covariates that we used in the previous regressions and an additional variable, whether the …rm is located in a technology park. We use sample B for this analysis. In Spain, technology parks are created by either the federal or regional governments with the aim of attracting innovative …rms and universities and encouraging intra-park collaboration (Vásquez-Urriago et al., 2011). While locating in one of these parks might facilitate external collaboration it should not bias collaboration with either …rms or universities, as both are present in these parks. To validate our conjecture, we included a dummy for whether a …rm is located in a technology park in equations one and two. The coe¢ cient on the dummy was not statistically signi…cant in either case. However, being located in a technology park has a positive and signi…cant impact on the likelihood that a …rm outsources. The results are reported in Table 4 . The coe¢ cients of P hD it and P hD it _Share are still positive and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. This suggests that had …rm R&D units that conducted no outsourcing engaged in outsourcing, they would have matched with external partners based on their learning costs.
In Table 5 , we present the results of estimations of equations 1-4, using a one-year lag for our independent variables of interest. Using lags controls for the possibility of a time gap between the point at which a …rm R&D unit begins working on a project and the time when it begins working with an external partner. As expected, the results are robust to using a one-year lag.
Finally, in Table 6 we present the results of estimations of equations 1-4 using a random e¤ect (RE) model 8 . The results for the impacts of P hD it and P hD it _Share on the share of outsourcing to universities hold also in this case.
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Concluding Remarks
Our study makes two important contributions to the understanding of the optimal organization of R&D …rms and their choice of outsourcing partners. The …rst contribution consists of extending the theory of hierarchical sorting within an organization developed by Garicano (2000) , Garicano and Hubbard (2005) , and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) to the optimal matching between …rms'internal R&D units and external outsourcing partners.
Our theory examines a setting in which the manager of an R&D …rm needs to select a project from a menu of projects that di¤er in some characteristic. In our model, labor is sticky, and the …rm's choice depends on the knowledge of its internal R&D unit, the composition of which does not change. This analysis is appropriate to analyze the short-run decisions of …rms, especially in contexts in which the labor market is characterized by important rigidities. Once the …rm manager has made her choice, she needs to select an external partner that will collaborate on the project with the internal R&D unit. Our focus is on projects that involve the creation of new knowledge and that require at least some level of outsourcing. This last characteristic is typical of projects that are complex enough that a …rm is induced to hire an external partner, which will assist the internal R&D unit with problem solving. The rationale for hiring an external partner is that the partner can obtain a certain level of knowledge, on a project chosen by the …rm, at lower costs than the …rm's internal R&D unit.
Our main result is that in an economy with a continuum of …rms distributed across a project characteristics, …rms will …nd it optimal to select a project for which the internal R&D unit and the external partner will have a similar comparative advantage in problem solving. This is because it allows the external partner to spend relatively more time solving rarer problems than assisting the internal R&D unit. We believe this is an interesting result in that it shows that a pro…t-maximizing strategy for an …rm consists in having the external partner relatively specialize in solving rarer problems, and have the internal R&D unit relatively specialize in solving the most common ones. Indeed, it is not pro…table for a …rm to outsource the solution to problems to an external partner, and have the internal unit specialize on the application of the relative solutions.
The second contribution we make is to test the predictions of our theory using a rich dataset of Spanish manufacturing …rms that conducted innovating activities during the 2006-2009 period. Within this sample, we focus on those …rms that conducted at least some level of R&D outsourcing. For these …rms, we relate the share of R&D outsourcing to universities to the composition of their R&D units, described by the presence of sta¤ with a PhD degree. The logic is that both universities and R&D units with PhD sta¤ members have lower relative costs of conducting relatively more basic projects than companies to which the …rm might want to outsource or with sta¤ without PhD degrees.
We …nd evidence that R&D units with PhD sta¤ tend to collaborate relatively more with universities than with other partners. We interpret this result as evidence that R&D units with relatively low learning costs for basic projects tend to match with external partners, universities, with relatively low learning costs for the same projects.
We believe our study contributes to uncovering the mechanisms through which R&D collaboration generates value for a …rm. The patterns we have highlighted are typical of projects that involve the creation of new knowledge. These are projects in which the value added is measured in terms of the number of problems that are solved. For these projects, we analyzed the properties of an optimal match between …rms'R&D units and their external partners. The reality, of course, is more complex than the one we have described. Indeed, …rms not only can choose projects, conditionally on the characteristics of an R&D unit, but they can also hire new R&D units conditionally on the characteristics of a project they intend to undertake. Even in these cases, the problem of …nding an optimal match between an internal R&D unit and an external partner remains relevant. By …nding an optimal match, the …rm achieves the optimal allocation of the internal unit's time between problem solving and production, as well as the optimal allocation of the external partner's time between problem solving and assisting the internal unit.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1 we need to show that @zi@ce . This last expression is equal to:
Using the …rst order condition for z i , we can rewrite the expression above as:
Noting that
This expression is < 0 if
ze c i = k, which we have assumed in the text.
Standard comparative statics show that
Appendix B: Variables Construction
h Insert Table B1 about here i
To obtain the publications in scienti…c …elds that are relevant to a …rm in a given industry, we follow Abramovsky et al. (2009) and match the scienti…c …elds to industries using data from the 1994 Carnegie Mellon Survey (CNS). This survey reports the importance of the following ten research …elds to each industry: biology, chemistry, physics, computer science, material science, medical and health science, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering and mathematics. We follow Abramovsky et al.'s criterion that a research …eld is relevant for an industry if more than 50% of the CNS respondents report that the …eld is moderately or very important for the industry in which the respondent is active. Table B2 shows the matching between industries and scienti…c …elds. Data on publications by university and scienti…c …eld for were obtained from website: http://sci2s.ugr.es/rankinguniversidades/. This website provides information on the total number of publications for every Spanish university in di¤erent scienti…c …elds using data from Thomson-Reuters Web of Science although the information is not provided on an annual basis. 122 The dependent variable is the share of firm outsourcing to universities. Sample A includes all innovating firms that on a given year had conducted at least some outsourcing. Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The dependent variable is the share of firm outsourcing to universities. Sample B includes all innovating firms, without restricting the analysis to those that on a given year had engaged in outsourcing. Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 is the share of firm outsourcing to universities. Sample A includes all innovating firms that on a given year had conducted at least some outsourcing. Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. We allow for a one-year lag between the composition of an internal R&D unit and the share of firm outsourcing. Sample A includes all innovating firms that on a given year had conducted at least some outsourcing. Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. We estimate the probability that a firm, on a given year, did at least some level of outsourcing. Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
